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I. INTRODUCTION
Antitrust law in the United States is the patchwork result of
over two hundred years of evolving and often conflicting views of the
government's proper role in regulating business. Depending upon the
social and business climate of the era and the economic philosophies of
Congress, the President, and the judiciary, federal antitrust
jurisdiction has waxed and waned. The result is the current system
wherein the Department of Justice Antitrust Division ("Antitrust
Division") and the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") share dual
jurisdiction to enforce the federal antitrust laws.1 However, in the
push and pull of the changing eras, the intersection of the two
agencies' jurisdiction has become hazy and often troublesome.
Nowhere is the uncertainty more evident than in the process by which
the two agencies decide which will review and investigates a proposed
merger.
In 2002, FTC Commissioner Timothy Muris and Assistant
Attorney General Charles James announced the Merger Clearance
Accord in an attempt to replace the old merger clearance process with
a streamlined one in which each agency was given jurisdiction over
mergers in particular industries. 2 The agreement they reached was
1. While the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice share responsibility for
enforcing the bulk of antitrust laws and will be the focus of this Note, there are other state and
federal entities, such as State Attorneys General and the Federal Communications Commission,
which wield varying degrees of lesser authority.
2. The Washington Post provided a colorful explanation of the clearance agreement in
place when Muris and James attempted to implement the 2002 Merger Clearance Accord:
There are a handful of industries in which both the FTC and Justice
Department have expertise. So when a hot merger comes up, and the staff of
each agency wants a piece of it, the assistant attorney general for antitrust
and the FTC chairman have to sort it out. This had been done in an ancient
ritual that included a series of athletic events such as arm wrestling, mud
wrestling, greased-pig wrestling and a bull-riding competition, and an essay
contest. Okay, we're making that up. Well, most of it. The agencies really do
write essays explaining why they are best to review the mergers. And there
really has been a lot of wrangling over who would get to review a merger. The
"discussions" would last more than two weeks sometimes, and that's almost
half the 30 days in which investigators must decide whether to launch a more
detailed review, called a "second request" for documents. Delays of more than
15 days occurred 32 times in 2000.
James V. Grimaldi, Enron Case Attracts Lawyers Like a Flame Attracts Moths, More Than You
Can Shake a Stick at, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2002, at E2.
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the result of cooperation between an independent agency and an
executive branch agency in an admirable effort to improve the state of
federal antitrust enforcement.
Senator Ernest F. Hollings, a Democrat from South Carolina,
immediately, publicly, and dramatically raised the alarm, claiming
that the allocation of review over media mergers to the Antitrust
Division would result in a narrow-minded, unfair review by an
executive branch agency completely beholden to the President. 3 After
a few months of theatrics and behind-the-scenes maneuvering, James
and Muris publicly announced the abandonment of the agreement and
returned to the status quo. The success of Hollings's solo efforts raises
many important issues addressed in this Note.
The implications of the failed 2002 Merger Clearance Accord
(the "Accord") are particularly worthy of examination in light of the
political attention the federal antitrust agencies have attracted in
recent years. Modern federal antitrust enforcement has a tremendous
impact on the economy, and big business has a significant financial
stake in how the antitrust laws are administered. The shortcomings of
the pre-clearance process by which the two agencies allocate
responsibility for reviewing mergers have not gone unnoticed by the
legal, political, and business communities. Congress passed the
Antitrust Modernization Commission Act of 2002 "to examine whether
the need exists to modernize the antitrust laws and to identify and
study related issues," by soliciting comments from all interested
parties, evaluating proposals, and eventually reporting the findings to
Congress and the President.4  The Antitrust Modernization
Commission ("AMC") was charged with examining and suggesting
improvements for the breadth of antitrust enforcement, including
issues that arise out of dual merger enforcement. 5 Any potential
solution can be informed by the recently announced findings of the
AMC. 6
3. Martin Sikora, Regulators Bow to Senator Hollings, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS J., July
1, 2002, at 13, 13.
4. Antitrust Modernization Commission Act of 2002 § 11053, 15 U.S.C. § 1 n.4 (2006)
(Other Provisions). The Antitrust Modernization Commission ("AMC") is comprised of twelve
bipartisan commissioners, broken down into groups of four appointed by the President, Senate
leadership, and the House of Representatives leadership who are appointed for the duration of
the Commission's life. Id. § 11054(a), (c). The AMC's tenure will terminate thirty days after it
submits its report to the President and Congress, which is to be not more than three years after
the Commission holds its first meeting. Id. §§ 11058-59.
5. Id. § 11053; ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, INITIAL SLATE OF ISSUES
SELECTED FOR STUDY 2 (2005), available at http://www.amc.gov/ pdf/meetings/study-issues.pdf.




This Note will examine the failed 2002 Merger Clearance
Accord in light of its implications for federal antitrust enforcement
and any future attempts to improve the interaction between the FTC
and the Antitrust Division and with Congress. The Accord had the
potential to improve the quality of antitrust enforcement for both the
corporations being investigated and the consumers being protected,
but failed for narrow political reasons. A central tenet of
administrative law scholarship is that political control of agencies is
acceptable and helps to legitimize the otherwise shaky constitutional
foundations of the "fourth branch."7 This game of political "chicken,"
however, in which an individual member of Congress used public
threats of funding cuts to force the agencies to back down from a
substantively good agreement, is not necessarily a practice to
celebrate.
Part II will examine the history of the two agencies,
particularly how previous inter-agency agreements regarding merger
review laid the groundwork for the 2002 Accord. The history of the
FTC and the Antitrust Division is marked by a tension between
reconciling the separate missions and spheres of the agencies while
formulating an effective federal antitrust enforcement regime. Part III
will then analyze the legislative authority, found in the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, for the FTC and the
Antitrust Division's entering into the Accord. Part IV will discuss the
substantive merits of the accord that underscore the troubling nature
of its defeat by a single senator. Part V will examine whether Senator
Hollings's actions well served the role of congressional control of
administrative agencies. Finally, Part VI will suggest three
approaches to improving the interaction between the FTC, the
Antitrust Division, and Congress: amending the organic statute to
increase the specificity regarding the clearance process, devoting
greater attention to the power of the officials appointed to head the
agencies, and considering developing future accords through notice-
and-comment rulemaking. These three approaches, or a combination
thereof, may strengthen the position of the two agencies should they
7. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2246-47 (2001)
(discussing theories of congressional and presidential control of administrative agencies);
Timothy A. Wilkins & Terrell E. Hunt, Agency Discretion and Advances in Regulatory Theory:
Flexible Agency Approaches Toward the Regulated Community as a Model for the Congress-
Agency Relationship, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 479, 479-80 (1995) ("The central project of most
American administrative law scholarship, practice, and jurisprudence has been the development
of appropriate means to control agency discretion. Our overriding concern with the discretionary
authority of administrative agencies finds its source largely in separation-of-powers-rooted
fears." (citations omitted)).
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make another attempt to streamline and improve federal antitrust
enforcement.
II. BACKGROUND
A. History and Development of the Two Agencies
Historically, the United States has eschewed any substantial
level of government restraint on commerce and trade, but there has
been a widespread mistrust of and effort to thwart the formation of
monopolies.8 It is unsurprising that the Sherman Antitrust Act, the
watershed 1890 antitrust legislation, focused on making both
monopolies and anticompetitive business practices, such as cartels,
illegal.9 In the ensuing decades the Department of Justice, under the
direction of ambitious presidents such as Theodore Roosevelt and
William Taft, focused on breaking up "trusts," including Standard
Oil.1° It was not until the passage of the Clayton Act in 1914 that the
focus of antitrust was further clarified to include price discrimination,
tying and exclusive-dealing contracts, corporate mergers, and
interlocking directorates where these practices "may substantially
lessen competition" or "tend to create a monopoly."11
The Clayton Act, particularly § 7, broadened the government's
investigatory and regulatory powers under the Sherman Act by
conferring authority to regulate potential monopolies before they are
fully realized. 12 In the same year as the Clayton Act's passage, the
Federal Trade Commission Act established the FTC as an
independent administrative agency charged with the prevention of
''unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." 13 Over the
decades that followed, court decisions and congressional acts have
expanded the scope of the FTC's power to enforce the FTC, Sherman,
8. FREDERICK K. GRITTNER & MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, WEST'S FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE




12. H.R. REP. No. 94-1373, at 7 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2637, 2639 ("As
the preamble to the original Clayton bill proclaimed, its purpose was 'to prohibit certain trade
practices which.., singly and in themselves are not covered by the Sherman Act ... and thus to
arrest the creation of trusts, conspiracies and monopolies in their incipiency and before
consummation.'" (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962))).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2006).
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and Clayton Acts. 14 In 1933 President Franklin Roosevelt established
the modern Antitrust Division within the Department of Justice,
underscoring his administration's commitment to enforcing the
antitrust laws as part of his broader scheme to help the country climb
out of the Great Depression.15
In 1948, the two agencies reached an agreement to divide
responsibility for merger enforcement which would be the precursor
for the modern merger clearance agreements.16 The evolution of
antitrust jurisprudence and economic analysis brought about many
substantive changes in enforcement during the years that followed
this initial agreement, yet the basic procedural question of how the
agencies should interact with one another still lacked a definitive
answer.
B. Hart-Scott-Rodino and the Merger Clearance Process
Congress passed the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976 ("HSR Act") to remedy some of the
perceived shortcomings of the existing patchwork of antitrust
legislation. 17 The aspect of the HSR Act that has had the greatest
impact on the interaction of the two agencies was the establishment of
14. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945)
(holding that Alcoa monopolized the ingot market); Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383, 1383 (1976) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18a
(2006)) (stating that the Act's purpose was "[tlo improve and facilitate the expeditious and
effective enforcement of the antitrust laws .... ). While it is beyond the scope of this Note, over
the years, Congress passed statutes and amendments expanding the FTC's mission to include
administering truth-in-advertising and consumer protection laws, including the Wheeler-Lea
Amendment in 1938, "which included a broad prohibition against 'unfair and deceptive acts or
practices,'" as well as the "Magnuson-Moss Act, which gave the FTC the authority to adopt trade
regulation rules that define unfair or deceptive acts in particular industries." FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, FACTS FOR CONSUMERS: GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/general/guidetoftc.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2007).
15. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, TIMELINE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT HIGHLIGHTS AT
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/timeline.pdf (last visited
Apr. 9, 2007) (showing that while the term "Antitrust Division" may have been used as early as
1919, it was not until June of 1933 that the first Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust
Division, Harold M. Stevens, was confirmed and began his tenure).
16. See Janet D. Steiger, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, Remarks at the Meeting of
the Section of Antitrust Law of the American Bar Association: Report from the Federal Trade
Commission (Apr. 8, 1994), in 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 277, 293 (1994) (noting the 45th anniversary of
the original inter-agency agreement).
17. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1373, at 5 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2637, 2637
("The purpose of H.R. 14580 is to amend the federal anti-merger law, Section 7 of the Clayton
Antitrust Act by establishing premerger notification and waiting requirements for corporations
planning to consummate very large mergers and acquisitions." (citation omitted)).
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a premerger notification process and waiting period.18 Under § 7 of the
Clayton Act, both agencies are charged with the prevention of
potential and probable monopolies. 19 Prior to the passage of the HSR
Act, however, the agencies had to be proactive in seeking out news of
impending mergers. If an agency received word of a potential merger
that seemed troubling, theoretically it could seek a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction to halt the transaction to
allow the agency to investigate further. 20 In practice, it was very
difficult to obtain a timely injunction because the government agencies
carried the burden of proof in seeking a preliminary injunction,
"without advance notice of an impending merger, data relevant to its
legality, and at least several weeks to prepare a case, the government
often ha[d] no meaningful chance to carry its burden of proof, and win
a preliminary injunction against a merger that appears to violate
section 7. ' '21
The Congress that enacted the HSR Act recognized the high
stakes involved if the FTC and Antitrust Division were not able to
prevent an anticompetitive merger. Post-consummation,
many large mergers become almost unchallengeable .... [because diuring the course of
the post-merger litigation, the acquired firm's assets, technology, marketing systems,
and trademarks are replaced, transferred, sold off, or combined with those of the
acquiring firm. Similarly, its personnel and management are shifted, restrained, or
simply discharged.
2 2
At this point, any victory on the part of the government would be
largely symbolic and even if they could succeed in breaking up the
merged corporation, it would likely have anticompetitive effects. 23
The HSR Act implemented a premerger notification process
and waiting period which attempted to alleviate the government's
considerable burden of proof and informational disadvantages. Under
the new law, prospective acquiring corporations whose proposed
acquisition was worth more than a particular monetary value were
18. The other effect of the HSR Act was to give the DOJ's Antitrust Division broader powers
to issue civil investigative demands "to compel the submission of documents, answers to written
interrogatories, and oral testimony from any person having information relevant to a possible
civil antitrust violation." H.R. REP. No. 94-1343, at 2 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2596, 2596. The FTC already possessed similar broad powers. Id.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
20. See id. §§ 25, 53(b) (describing the processes available to obtain these restraint devices).
21. H.R. REP. No. 94-1373, at 8 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2637, 2640.
22. Id.
23. See id. at 5, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2637, 2637 (stating that the purposes of
the bill include strengthening the government's ability to mergers before they occur, "before the
assets, technology, and management of the merging firms are hopelessly and irreversibly




required to file notice with the Antitrust Division and the FTC. 24 The
Act further provided that along with the notification, the merging
parties were to submit "documentary material and information
relevant to the proposed acquisition as is necessary and appropriate to
enable the Federal Trade Commission and the Assistant Attorney
General to determine whether such acquisition may, if consummated,
violate antitrust laws."25
If the agencies found nothing potentially anticompetitive about
the merger within the thirty-day waiting period, they could terminate
the waiting period ("early termination") or simply let it run out,
leaving the parties free to proceed with the acquisition. 26 If the
submission raised issues that one or both of the agencies wished to
pursue, they could require the parties to submit additional supporting
material (a "second request"). Issuing a second request stopped the
clock on the waiting period and allowed the agencies additional time
to decide whether to seek a preliminary injunction in District Court to
halt the merger while the agency brought a suit claiming that the
merger violates § 7 of the Clayton Act.27 The HSR Act aimed to
decrease reliance on the Sherman Act to "break up" already
consummated mergers and to shift the focus on preventing
anticompetitive mergers before they were finalized.
While the HSR Act detailed the framework of the premerger
notification process, it did not specify how the two agencies were to
determine which agency, if any, would pursue an investigation and
suit against the merging parties. In fact, Congress explicitly delegated
authority to the FTC and Antitrust Division to "define the terms used
in this section; ... and prescribe such other rules as may be necessary
and appropriate to carry out the purposes of this section."28 While
most of the time, only one or neither of the agencies seeks to pursue
an investigation, there are times when both wish to investigate the
proposed merger. Decades before the HSR Act, "the clearance process
resulted from a 1948 interagency agreement to determine whether the
24. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a) ("no person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, any voting securities
or assets of any other person, unless both persons.., file notification pursuant to rules under
subsection (d)(1) of this section and the waiting period described in subsection (b)(1) of this
section has expired").
25. Id. § (d)(1). The FTC has promulgated rules which instruct merging parties as to the
type of documentation they must submit. Notification and Report Form for Certain Mergers and
Acquisitions, 16 C.F.R. § 803 app. 1 (2006).
26. The waiting period is shortened to fifteen days in the case of a cash tender offer. 15
U.S.C. § 18a(b)(1)(B).
27. Id. § (e)(1)(A).
28. Id. § (d)(2)(A), (C).
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FTC or Antitrust Division is best suited to address a matter."29 Before
either agency can open an investigation, the two agencies must agree
which will conduct it. The broad delegation under the HSR to fill in
the procedural blanks allowed the agencies to maintain control over
the structure and implementation of the clearance process. 30
The HSR Act may not have provided any procedures for inter-
agency division of responsibility for investigating mergers, but the
premerger notification process it implemented created an environment
that intensified the importance of a good working relationship
between the Antitrust Division and the FTC. The HSR premerger
notification requirements gave the agencies the tools necessary to
learn of every proposed merger over a certain size and to mount a
challenge against them successfully before the merging companies
became hopelessly entangled. As the focus of antitrust enforcement
began to shift, the agencies devoted more and more of their energies to
investigating HSR mergers. In this context, the speed with which they
could resolve any clearance disputes became even more important.
Under the HSR Act, these investigations were constrained by
statutorily enforced time limits. 31 If the agencies failed to resolve
disputes in a timely fashion, they risked missing the only window of
opportunity for thwarting the merger before it occurred.
C. The Ill-Fated 2002 FTC/DOJ Merger Clearance Accord
1. The 1993 and 1995 Agreements-Setting the Stage for Reform
In the years following the passage of the HSR Act, the
relatively loose interagency clearance agreement needed refinement; it
failed to reach a desirable level of efficiency and effectiveness. 32 In
1993, the FTC and the Antitrust Division issued "Clearance
Procedures for Investigations," under which "the principal
consideration in clearance decisions is agency expertise in the product
29. William J. Baer, Deborah L. Feinstein & Randal M. Shaheen, Taking Stock: Recent
Trends in U.S. Merger Enforcement, 18 ANTITRUST, Spring 2004, at 15, 20.
30. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(d) (permitting the agencies to define terms, exempt persons and
transactions from the requirements of the section, and promulgate rules "necessary and proper
to carry out the section's purposes").
31. See id. § (b)(1)(B) (setting forth thirty- or fifteen-day waiting periods, unless extended
per statute for further examination).
32. See SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, COMMENTS IN
RESPONSE TO THE ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION'S REQUEST FOR PUBLIC COMMENT
REGARDING GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTIONS 10 (2005), available at
http://www.amc.gov/public studies fr28902/enforcementpdf/
051028_ABAFedEnforcInstDualEnforc.pdf [hereinafter ABA AMC Comments] (noting
recent efforts and the failure to cure efficiency problems).
2007] 1315
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in question. 33 The 1993 guidelines provided a hierarchy of experience
by which the agencies were to determine who had the greater
expertise. 34 These guidelines failed to substantially expedite the
clearance procedure because neither agency had much incentive to
cede any turf in the name of more timely enforcement. Consequently,
the agencies adopted the Hart-Scott-Rodino Premerger Program
Improvements agreement in 1995, which memorialized a commitment
by the FTC and the Antitrust Division to resolve all clearance disputes
within nine business days of the filing of a merger.35
Efforts to reduce the length of clearance disputes met with
mixed results, and the legal, government, and business communities
remained dissatisfied.3 6 Clearance disputes were still taking up a
considerable percentage of the thirty-day waiting period, leaving the
"winning" agency with a truncated period of time within which to
investigate and determine whether to issue a second request.37
Anecdotal evidence confirms that the reduction in time predisposes
the reviewing agency to issue a second request to compensate for the
lack of time for thorough review.38 Issuing a second request delays the
earliest possible date at which the parties could consummate the
merger, triggers massive document production and increased legal
fees, and can potentially scare off one or more parties to the merger. 39
Accordingly, it is in the best interests of both the regulated entities
and the regulatory beneficiaries to ensure that the clearance process is
resolved swiftly and efficiently. An efficient clearance process allows
the reviewing agency as much time as possible within the waiting
period to make an informed decision on whether to issue a second
33. Baer et al., supra note 29, at 20.
34. See id. ("Expertise results from experience conducting 'a substantial investigation' of the
product in the same geographic area within the past five years.").
35. Id.
36. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, CLEARANCE DELAYS, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/02/
clearance/cleardelaystats.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2007) (criticizing clearance delays during the
28 months following the start of FY 2000).
37. See id. (finding the average delay in a clearance dispute to be 17.5 days during the time
period in question).
38. See Letter from John J. Castellani, President, The Bus. Roundtable, et al., to Timothy
Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm. 4 (Feb. 25, 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/02/clearancefbrt.pdf (identifying Second Requests or withdrawn
filings as results of clearance delays); ABA AMC Comments, supra note 32, at 10 (same).
39. See Letter from Roxane C. Busey, Chair, ABA Section of Antitrust Law, to Charles A.
James, Assistant Attorney Gen. for Antitrust & Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm.
1-2 (Jan. 23, 2002), available at http://ftc.gov/opa/2002/02/clearance/aba.pdf ("[T]he 'clearance
process' had in the past consumed a significant part of the 30-day waiting period in a number of
transactions, leading to either 'second requests' occasioned solely by a lack of time for a
preliminary review of the proposed transaction, or unnecessary re-filings to avoid such 'second
requests.' ").
1316 [Vol. 60:4:1307
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request. When the clearance process is efficient, merging parties have
a better opportunity to receive a fair review and consumers are
protected by agencies that do not have to make enforcement decisions
in an artificially reduced timeframe.
2. Muris and James Strike a Deal
By the time Timothy Muris inherited the reins as
Commissioner of the FTC in 2001, conflicts between the FTC and the
Antitrust Division had escalated into the truly absurd. Though the
two agencies had long shared their jurisdiction for merger review and
enforcement by operating pursuant to inter-agency agreements, the
effectiveness of the 1995 agreement, still in place in 2001, had become
strained.40 Muris had been warned by his predecessor that clearance
disputes were having a severe effect on the FTC, but he soon
learned of the existence of a pending, year-long clearance dispute concerning matters
involving the digital distribution and sale of music. At each agency, the overwhelming
belief among those familiar with the dispute was that the other agency did not have a
reasonable claim. In short, the prevailing view on both sides was that the other was
acting in bad faith.4 1
The image of entrenched bureaucrats, fighting for more than a
year over who would be allowed to initiate an investigation, brings to
mind the unkindest caricatures of bureaucratic waste and inefficiency.
The merger clearance process was a perfect candidate for reform.
The clearance agreements in 1993 and 1995 had failed to
produce the desired improvements. In fact, there is evidence that the
number of clearance fights actually increased and that they were
becoming a considerable problem.42 Aware of the shortcomings of their
clearance process and the consequences of these inadequacies, the
FTC and the Antitrust Division undertook a study to determine the
severity of the problem. 43 The study covered twenty-eight months from
the beginning of Fiscal Year 2000:
There were 136 matters in which clearance was contested. In other words, there were
136 matters in which both agencies filed for clearance. On average, these contested
matters took 17.8 business days, or approximately three and a half weeks, to resolve.
40. See TIMOTHY J. MURIS, COMMENTS ON THE FTC-DOJ CLEARANCE PROCESS BEFORE THE
ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION 3-4 (2005), available at http://www.amc.gov/
commission hearings/pdf/ MurisStatement.pdf (recognizing "deficiencies" and "deterioration" in
the clearance process).
41. Id. at 4-5.
42. Id. at 5-6.
43. CLEARANCE DELAYS, supra note 36; see also MURIS, supra note 40, at 4-5 (discussing a
year-long clearance dispute he inherited from his predecessor over a digital music and
distribution investigation which was eventually settled by consulting a neutral arbitrator).
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In another 164 matters, clearance took more than one week to resolve, although no
formal clearance dispute occurred.
On average, these 300 matters-24 percent of all matters for which clearance requests
were filed-imposed delays of three weeks.
4 4
The FTC Commissioner, Timothy Muris, and the Assistant
Attorney General for Antitrust, Charles James, commissioned an
independent group of former agency officials to propose new guidelines
for the clearance process. 45 The result of their recommendations,
which would form the basis for the 2002 Merger Clearance Accord,
was a division of authority according to the industry of the merging
parties.46 The industries were allocated by the independent advisors
based upon the same considerations of agency expertise and
experience promulgated in the 1993 and 1995 guidelines.47
Unlike the earlier guidelines, these were to be permanent
allocations, eliminating the protracted disputes that arose when the
separate agencies challenged each other's expertise in an industry. If
the Accord's division of industries failed to provide a clear guide as to
which agency should handle a particular investigation, it established a
process whereby the agency heads could submit the dispute to a third-
44. CLEARANCE DELAYS, supra note 36.
45. Letter from Kevin Arquit, Bill Baer, Joe Sims & Steve Sunshine to Timothy Muris,
Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm. & Charles James, Assistant Attorney Gen. for Antitrust (Dec. 21,
2001), available at http://ftc.gov/opa/2002/02/clearance/clearideas.htm. The four authors of the
new guidelines were alumni of the FTC and the Antitrust Division and were evenly split between
those who worked for Republican administrations and those who worked for Democratic ones. Id.
46. See id. (setting forth the recommender's division); Memorandum of Agreement Between
the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of
Justice Concerning Clearance Procedures for Investigations 8-11 (Mar. 5, 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/02/clearance/ftcdojagree.pdf [hereinafter 2002 Agreement] (setting
forth the final negotiated division). The FTC was given jurisdiction over mergers in the following
industries: airframes; autos and trucks; building materials; chemicals; computer hardware;
energy; healthcare; industrial gases; munitions; operation of grocery stores and grocery
manufacturing, including distilled spirits and tobacco; operation of retail stores; pharmaceuticals
and biotechnology; professional services; satellite manufacturing and launch, and launch
vehicles; and textiles. 2002 Agreement, supra. The Antitrust Division was given authority over
the following types of mergers: agriculture and associated biotechnology; avionics, aeronautics,
and defense electronics; beer; computer software; cosmetics and hair care; financial
services/insurance/stock and option, bond, and commodity markets; flat glass; health insurance
and healthcare products and services over which the FTC determines it may lack jurisdiction;
industrial equipment; media and entertainment; metals, mining and minerals; missiles, tanks,
and armored vehicles; naval defense products; photography and film; pulp, paper, lumber, and
timber; telecommunications services and equipment; travel and transportation; and waste. Id.
47. See 2002 Agreement, supra note 46, at 4 (detailing the general standard for clearance as
whether an agency had "expertise in the product involved in the proposed investigation gained
through a substantial antitrust investigation of the product within the last seven years").
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party arbitrator.48 In short, the Accord sought to institutionalize the
standards the agencies were already using to determine who would
proceed with an investigation in an effort to eliminate the
inefficiencies in time and resources and to combat the perceived
problem of skewed agency incentives. 49
III. THE ANTITRUST LAWS & CONGRESS'S BROAD GRANT OF DISCRETION
TO THE AGENCIES
The various agreements between the FTC and Antitrust
Division regarding the clearance process occupy a precarious position
within the gaps in Congress's delegation to the agencies. While each
agency has exclusive jurisdiction over particular aspects of antitrust
regulation, both are charged with enforcing §§ 2, 3, 7, and 8 of the
Clayton Act. 50 This dual jurisdiction creates many opportunities for
duplication and inefficiency. As discussed previously, the two agencies
have struggled to find an effective system for reconciling conflicts that
arise out of their shared authority since their first agreement in
1948.51 Congress has provided a paucity of guidance in both the
legislative history and the text of the applicable legislation, which set
48. See id. at 3, 6. The Agreement stated:
If the staff or senior officials at each agency are unable to resolve a clearance dispute
within 144 hours following receipt of the initial clearance request, the matter will be
referred to the Chairman of the FTC and the Assistant Attorney General in charge of
the Antitrust Division ("the agency heads").
Within 48 hours of submission of a dispute to them, the agency heads will determine
whether to submit the dispute to the Neutral Evaluation dispute resolution
mechanism described below.
... [The Neutral] shall be selected, by lot, from a pre-established, mutually-agreeable
panel of experts (such as academics, retired government employees or other
knowledgeable individuals)....
The Neutral will tender a recommendation within 48 hours of the Neutral's
appointment.
Id.
49. See MURIS, supra note 40, at 5-7 (identifying the four categories of problems with the
status quo that the Accord sought to remedy: delays in clearing matters, distortion in internal
agency resource allocation, interagency friction, and diminished transparency).
50. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL ch. 7 § A
(rev. 3d ed. 1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/foia/divisionmanuallch7.htm (adding
that "[j]udicial interpretation of Section 5 of the FTC Act permits the FTC to challenge conduct
that also may constitute a Sherman Act violation, and thus, there is an overlap with the Division
in this area as well").
51. See Victor R. Hansen, Functioning of the Antitrust Division-Its Relationship to the
Federal Trade Commission and Current Policies of the Division, 13 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEC. 20, 21
(1958) (describing the agreement for "systematic mutual exchange of information regarding
pending investigations and new investigations being handled by each agency").
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the stage for difficulties in resolving disputes and division of labor
throughout the existence of the FTC and the Antitrust Division.
Prior to its amendment by the HSR Act, the Clayton Act made
nearly no reference to the issue of overlapping jurisdiction. 52 Implicit
in the delegation of authority to regulate mergers was the discretion to
determine which agency would undertake a particulate investigation.
However, the HSR Act, which implemented the reporting requirement
for mergers above a certain value, provided the FTC and the Antitrust
Division a loose framework within which the agencies devised their
clearance agreements.53 The provisions of the Act that pertain to the
premerger notification clearance process are as follows:
The Federal Trade Commission, with the concurrence of the Assistant Attorney
General...
(1) shall require that the notification required under subsection (a) be in such form and
contain such documentary material and information relevant to a proposed acquisition
as is necessary and appropriate to enable the Federal Trade Commission and the
Assistant Attorney General to determine whether such acquisition may, if
consummated, violate the antitrust laws; and
(2) may-
(A) define the terms used in this section;
(B) exempt, from the requirements of this section, classes of persons, acquisitions,
transfers, or transactions which are not likely to violate the antitrust laws; and
(C) prescribe such other rules as may be necessary and appropriate to carry out the
purposes of this section.
5 4
The HSR Act's delegation of authority to the two agencies is
broad, allowing them to "prescribe other such rules as may be
necessary and appropriate to carry out the purposes of this section. '55
The Act does not give any other indications how the agencies are
supposed to decide who reviews a proposed merger. It specifies that
notification of the merger is to be submitted to both agencies, but that
a second request is to be issued by only one agency:
The waiting period required under subsection (a) of this section shall-(A) begin on the
date of the receipt by the Federal Trade Commission and the Assistant Attorney
General in charge of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice .... 56
52. See Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730, 730-40 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-
27 (2006), 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (2006)).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (§ 7A of the Clayton Act).
54. Id. § (d) (emphasis added).
55. Id. § (d)(2)(C).
56. Id. § (b) (emphasis added).
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The Federal Trade Commission or the Assistant Attorney General may, prior to the
expiration of the 30-day waiting period .... require the submission of additional
information or documentary material relevant to the proposed acquisition .... 57
Accordingly, the agencies have filled in the gaps with inter-agency
agreements to determine who will pursue an investigation after both
have had the opportunity to review the initial HSR filing.5 8
The HSR Act does not provide much indication as to how
Congress expected the agencies to implement the merger clearance
process, and the legislative history sheds little more light on
Congress's intent with regards to the division of labor between the two
agencies. The House Committee Reports explicit state that one of the
major purposes of the legislation is to "strengthen the enforcement of
Section 7 [of the Clayton Act] by giving the government antitrust
agencies a fair and reasonable opportunity to detect and investigate
large mergers of questionable legality before they are consummated,"
but they do nothing to further specify the procedure the agencies
should follow to resolve any disputes over clearance. 59
The agencies resolved the issue through inter-agency
agreement but they could have used notice-and-comment rulemaking
instead. There are advantages to using notice-and-comment
rulemaking in this context-transparency, participation by the public,
and binding effect. 60 Notice-and-comment rulemaking is more formal
than the process by which Muris and James reached their agreement.
The process is set out in and governed by the Administrative
Procedure Act and removes much of the opaqueness of less formal
deal-making by bringing it out into the relative open. 6' But there are
also costs-the process can consume considerable time and resources.
An agency may value the speed, flexibility, and efficiency afforded by
less formal methods of rulemaking over the possible benefits of the
long notice-and-comment process. A party, including a regulated
entity, may challenge an agency's choice of procedures, so it is possible
that the FTC and the Antitrust Division may have faced a challenge if
they had been successful in implementing the 2002 Accord through
57. Id. § (e)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
58. Admittedly, of course, there is no dispute over who will conduct the investigation for the
majority of cases.
59. H.R. REP. No. 94-1373, at 6 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2637, 2638
(limiting the discussion of the agencies' discretion with respect to pre-merger clearance
procedures to a summary of subsection (d) as requiring "the FTC, with the concurrence of the
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, to specify by rule the information
which must be supplied on the premerger notification form").
60. See 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 153 (2007) (discussing the purposes and
benefits of notice-and-comment rulemaking).




informal means. 62 But neither the HSR Act 63 nor the APA64 plainly
required the agencies here to choose notice-and-comment
rulemaking. 65 In fact, the lack of guidance both in the text of the
statutes themselves and the accompanying legislative history indicate
that Congress has given little thought to controlling the division of
authority between the agencies. 66 The agencies took the most
important steps of settling the distribution of authority in a rational
fashion and then communicating that settlement to the public. The
next Part discusses these steps.
IV. THE MERITS OF THE MERGER CLEARANCE ACCORD
The impact of this episode hinges on the merits of the Merger
Clearance Accord. If the Accord itself was not a meritorious proposal
for resolving the clearance issues that have plagued the interaction of
the two agencies, then Senator Hollings's success in derailing it would
be less troubling from a policy standpoint. It is the potential positive
impact that the Accord would have had upon federal antitrust
enforcement that makes its defeat for narrow political reasons both
troublesome and worthy of study. The Accord would have reinforced
the agencies' longstanding policies and benefited consumers and
entities under investigation alike by improving the transparency,
efficiency, and quality of merger review. These benefits likely would
outweigh any arguable decrease in the quality or independence of
enforcement due to the loss of competition between the two agencies
for clearance approval.
The Accord's primary effect would have been to codify the
standards by which the agencies divided authority for merger review,
62. See W. Oil & Gas Ass'n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 633 F.2d 803, 813 (9th Cir. 1980)
(stating that ordinarily an agency's action will be invalidated for failure to comply with the APA
notice-and-comment requirements).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2006).
64. Section 553 of the APA carves out an exception to the notice-and-comment rulemaking
requirement for agency actions other than substantive rulemaking: "Except when notice or
hearing is required by statute, this subsection does not apply-(A) to interpretative rules, general
statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice." 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A)
(2006) (emphasis added).
65. I will, however, discuss in Section VI.C. the separate issue of whether it would have
been wise for the agencies to have used notice-and-comment rulemaking, even if not required to
do so.
66. See Marc Winerman, The Origins of the FTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control, and
Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 92 (2003). Winerman, in describing the process by which the
FTC and Clayton Acts were passed, wrote, 'The conference accepted the Senate's replacement of
criminal with administrative enforcement, leaving intact the Justice Department's civil
enforcement authority (and allowing the Department to challenge the same practice under both
the Sherman and Clayton Acts). The result, almost inadvertently, was dual jurisdiction under
the Clayton Act." Id.
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increasing the transparency of the process while eliminating the time-
consuming battles for clearance that occurred at the margins. It would
have done little to change the status quo of merger enforcement as
experienced by the majority of investigated entities.
A. The Accord Could Provide Increased Transparency and Meet the
Expectations of Consumers, Parties, and Congress
The history of interagency liaison agreements includes a
motley collection of informal letters and handshake agreements, as
well as the more formal agreements since the 1990s. What has
remained constant throughout is the commitment to avoid
unnecessary conflict and to ensure that whichever agency has
"expertise" in a field is assigned the particular matter. The 2002
Accord embodied all of the material aspirations of its predecessors,
and utilized a similar algorithm for determining who has jurisdiction
over the case. The difference was in the finality of the division of labor.
By setting out the industries over which each agency will have
authority, the 2002 Accord eliminated most of the inter-agency turf
battles and wasted resources and provided transparency that had
been lacking in the prior agreements. 67 The informal, multi-factored
nature of the earlier agreements had created an opaque status quo.
The 2002 Accord appeared to be a step in the direction of greater
transparency: It took the division of responsibility that has remained
relatively constant through decades of earlier agreements and
removed the uncertainty at the margins.
If the Accord had been successful, it would have not only met
the expectations of consumers and parties under investigation, but it
would have drawn support from the longstanding Congressional
acquiescence in earlier inter-agency agreements. While Congress had
not explicitly addressed the merger clearance process, the history of
Congressional acquiescence in earlier inter-agency liaison agreements
provides support for the agencies' actions in 2002. The agencies have
engaged in informal correspondence and agreements, which have
attempted to resolve the problems inherent in dual enforcement, since
1948.68 Muris's and James's attempt to formalize the division of
67. The earlier agreements are so informal and so poorly documented that even the FTC
and Antitrust Division had to cite to loose-leaf services when referring to the 1993 and 1995
agreements.
68. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, OVERVIEW OF THE FTC/DOJ CLEARANCE AGREEMENT,
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2OO2/O4/clearanceoverview.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2007)
("Since 1948, the agencies have agreed that neither would proceed until the other 'cleared' the
investigation to it."); see also Inter-Agency Cooperation, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 9,565.05
(2002). The Regulation states:
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responsibility was the first agreement which provoked the ire of a
member of Congress. For the most part, Congress has appeared
indifferent to how the agencies handled their relations with one
another.
While there have been numerous refinements to these informal
agreements, the general standards guiding the division of labor have
remained remarkably constant over the years. Victor Hansen,
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division from
1956 to 1959, explained that the original agreement, reached only a
few years earlier, was successful because "the activity of each agency
is not dependent on a mere arbitrary allocation of jurisdiction, but is
based upon a case-by-case account by past experience, present
manpower, and remedies available to each agency."69 Little about the
essential nature of the first interagency agreement changed over the
years as the agencies refined their relationship in response to
changing economic and political circumstances.
After operating under informal agreements for decades, the
two agencies responded to criticism regarding delays by instituting
the "Clearance Procedures for Investigations" in 1993.70 These
procedures announced the specific criteria the agencies would utilize
in resolving a clearance dispute.7 1 While the 1993 procedures provided
Because there is some overlap between the Justice Department and the
Federal Trade Commission antitrust responsibilities, the jurisdictional area
would be even more confusing were it not for a liaison agreement worked out
between these two agencies in 1948. It was agreed that dual jurisdiction
would not be taken in any particular case where it might otherwise occur.
4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 9,565.05.
69. See Hansen, supra note 51, at 21. Hansen wrote:
In June of 1948 the Department [of Justice] and the Commission established
a systematic mutual exchange of information regarding pending
investigations being handled by each agency. Under this procedure each
agency agreed to notify the other by an exchange of cards before initiating
any new investigation, grand jury proceeding, or trade practice
conference.... Upon receipt of this information, each agency can then
determine whether or not this new matter causes a conflict in any matter
then pending within that agency, and if so, can object to the proposed action.
If there is no conflict or duplication of effort involved, clearance is then given
the other agency to proceed with the investigation. This mutual exchange of
information has been primarily responsible for the fact that the two agencies
have with increasing success been able to cooperate in their dual
administration of the antitrust laws without serious conflict or duplication of
effort.
Id.
70. Clearance Procedures Between Division and FTC, 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) 746 (1993).
71. See Baer et al., supra note 29, at 20. Baer et al. wrote:
Under the 1993 guidelines, the principal consideration in clearance decisions
is agency expertise in the product in question. Expertise results from
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the criteria for determining who would undertake a given
investigation which have survived relatively intact through today,
they did not include any commitment to resolving disputes within a
certain time period.
Recognizing the inadequacies of the procedures adopted in
1993, the agencies announced a plan in March 1995 to improve their
interaction on merger clearance matters with "initiatives [that] were
designed to increase consistency between the agencies that share
responsibility for enforcing the [Clayton] Act and reducing compliance
burdens on businesses," by implementing commitments to resolving
clearance disputes within nine business days. 72 This 1995 agreement
was in place in 2002 when James and Muris announced the new
Accord.
Despite the history of many agreements, it was not until the
2002 Accord that any of the agreements provoked a significant
response from members of Congress. For the most part, Congress was
content to leave the details of inter-agency interaction to the agencies
themselves.73 The Accord codified the allocations and value judgments
embodied in the earlier agreements and eliminated any of the
uncertainty that had been left unresolved over the decades of
agreements.
experience conducting a "substantial investigation" of the product in the
same geographic area within the past five years. A "substantial investigation"
refers to any civil investigation that resulted in a second request and in
which the agency received and reviewed documents. If neither agency
examined the industry during the previous five years, the window is extended
to a ten-year period. When both agencies have substantial expertise, the 1993
agreement specified that the agency with litigation experience would take
precedence, followed, in descending order of importance, by the agency that
had filed a case, announced a challenge, conducted an ordinary second
request merger investigation, and conducted a civil conduct investigation. If
neither agency has undertaken a relevant substantial investigation, then
nonsubstantial matters will be considered.
Id. (citations omitted).
72. 1995 Joint U.S./FTC Premerger Program Improvements, 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
42,520 (2002); see also 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 42,521, which states:
The Agencies announce today eight major steps: (1) The Agencies will
determine which Agency will review proposed mergers within nine business
days from the date of filing and are implementing procedures to ensure that
deadline is met .... (3) The Agencies are establishing a procedure for
preclearance coordination by the Agencies and mechanisms to reduce undue
burdens on private parties during that time period .... (8) The Agencies are
increasing their efforts to work together through joint training, cross staffing,
and other cooperative acts to harmonize merger review efforts and promote
consistency.
73. See MURIS, supra note 40, at 17 n.12 (noting that Congress hasn't expressed much
interest in the clearance process, with one exception: "In 1981, Chairman John Dingle indicated
concern that the DOJ had deviated from existing inter-agency clearance policies and had chosen
to exercise jurisdiction over Mobil's possible takeover bid for Conoco").
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B. The Accord Could Have Eliminated the Negative Side Effects of
Agency Competition
In addition to meeting the mainly settled expectations of the
corporate world and Congress as to which agency would be charged
with undertaking an investigation in a particular industry, the merger
accord would have eliminated the negative side effects of the
competition between the two agencies. The elimination of competition
between the two agencies may have a significant impact on how each
agency undertakes their investigations, which may in turn affect
regulated entities.
The Accord had the potential to eliminate or reduce many of
the delays experienced under the earlier merger clearance processes.
The escalation in the number of clearance disputes through the 1990s
negatively impacted both the potential merging parties and consumers
in general. 74 During the short life of the Accord,"it took an average of
less than two business days to clear a matter to an agency, after the
agency submitted a request for clearance ... [and] there were no
clearance disputes over HSR filings."75 While the importance of these
statistics must be tempered by the realization that the Accord was
only in effect for eleven weeks, they indicate a possible shift of the
agencies' focus from battling over clearance to concentrating on the
task of enforcing the antitrust laws.
The goals of the agencies may shift if they are secure in their
jurisdiction over a particular industry and do not have to keep an eye
on racking up a "win" to add to their portfolio for the next clearance
battle. The clearance process in place both before and after the failed
2002 Accord could "actually create perverse incentives by penalizing,
rather than rewarding, agency efficiency." 76 Agencies are credited with
greater expertise if they have issued second requests in a particular
industry, so in the name of establishing precedent, they may decide to
issue a second request even if they could sufficiently resolve all issues
during the initial waiting period. 77 Conversely, if the allocation of
responsibility were settled, the FTC and the Antitrust Division may be
74. CLEARANCE DELAYS, supra note 36.
75. Memorandum from the AMC Staff to the AMC Commissioners 13 (May 19, 2006),
available at http://www.amc.gov/pdf/meetings/EnfInstFed-DiscMemo-pub.pdf (citing MUiS,
supra note 40, at 12).
76. Antitrust Modernization Commission, Hearings on the FTC-DOJ Clearance Process 2
(2005) (statement of John M. Nannes, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Division, Dep't of
Justice), available at http://www.amc.gov/commission-hearings/pdf/Nannes-Statement.pdf; see
also MURIS, supra note 40, at 6 ("The agencies waste precious enforcement resources contesting
the right to examine specific matters and in conducting investigations in marginal matters for
the purpose of using the experience gained to assert claims to other cases in the future.").
77. MURIS, supra note 40, at 6.
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more open to remedies that take into account factors other than
whether the agency looks like they are "successful." By concentrating
on a limited number of industries, the respective agencies may over
time develop a greater understanding of the unique markets and may
implement that knowledge in selecting mergers for investigation and
in fashioning remedies. 78 Agency resources that were previously
diverted toward fighting for clearance could be redeployed in
improving the substance and breadth of the agency's antitrust
enforcement.
C. The Arguments in Favor of Agency Competition Have Weakened
with Time
It can also be argued that the potential gains in efficiency and
transparency as a result of the Accord would not have been offset by
the loss of benefits of competition between the two agencies. While it
may have once been true that the two agencies approached merger
enforcement from substantially different viewpoints, each using its
own unique tools and procedures, the procedural and substantive
evolution of antitrust merger enforcement has narrowed and even
eliminated many of the former differences. 79 If the type of
investigation and enforcement actions undertaken will be similar
regardless of which agency has clearance for a particular merger, then
it becomes more difficult to justify these protracted turf battles.
Admittedly, the agencies are different from one another in a
number of respects. The FTC, an independent agency, is headed by a
five person bi-partisan commission whose terms are staggered and
who are only removable for cause.80 The FTC has both internal and
external processes at its disposal, so if in the course of investigating a
merger the agency determines that it warrants some type of legal
action, it can either initiate internal proceedings before an
Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") or can seek an injunction in the
78. See id. at 11 (identifying the benefits of specialization).
79. See Antitrust Modernization Commission: Hearings on the FTC-DOJ Clearance Process
3 (2005) (statement of Joe Sims, Senior Antitrust Partner, Jones Day), available at
http://www.amc.gov/commission -hearings/pdf/SimsStatement.pdf ("[B]oth agencies share the
same mission-protect consumers from anticompetitive conduct. The important thing is
accomplishing the mission, not which agency does it. In the vast majority of situations, it should
make absolutely no substantive difference which agency handles the matter.").
80. The removable "for cause" aspect of the FTC Commissioners was famously upheld in
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, when the Supreme Court held that President Roosevelt
could not discharge Commissioner Humphrey except for inefficiency, malfeasance, or neglect of
duty. 295 U.S. 602, 631-32 (1935). Roosevelt's purported objective of removing his predecessor's
appointee because he disagreed with him politically, id. at 618-19, did not meet the for cause
standard. Id. at 631-32.
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federal district court."' If the FTC elects to conduct an ALJ hearing,
the ALJ's decision is reviewable by the Commissioners, whose final
decision is also subject to judicial review. 2 This internal process may
be preferable because of the review by the Commissioners, who
ostensibly have greater expertise in antitrust than federal court
judges. Their expertise may make them better able to come to a
decision or fashion a remedy that is more beneficial for the economy
and consumers because it is grounded in antitrust jurisprudence and
economic theory.
The Antitrust Division, on the other hand, is a subsection of
the Department of Justice. The Department of Justice is headed by
the Attorney General, who serves at the pleasure of the President. 3
Accordingly, the investigations and enforcement activities undertaken
by the Antitrust Division are more likely to be in line with the overall
agenda of the current Presidential administration and as a result may
enjoy more support and wield more political clout.8 4 The Antitrust
Division does not have an internal hearing process akin to that of the
FTC, so it pursues its cases against corporations solely in federal
court.85
Over time Congress has provided the two agencies with tools
which have obscured the procedural differences between them. In fact,
the HSR Act's other primary effect, the expansion of the authority to
the Antitrust Division to issue Civil Investigative Demands ("CIDs"),
was perhaps the greatest change in the balance between the agencies'
available arsenals. 6 Until 1962, only the FTC had an investigatory
81. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
82. Id.
83. See ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, supra note 50, at ch.1 § B(3), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/foia/divisionmanual/chl.htm (describing organization of Antitrust
Division in relation to the Department of Justice).
84. However, the extent to which presidential control over executive branch agencies is
greater than presidential control over independent agencies is not settled. See Peter L. Strauss,
The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 573, 586-90 (1984). Strauss wrote:
The independent agencies are often free, at least in a formal sense, of other
relationships with the White House that characterize the executive branch
agencies. The President's influence reaches somewhat more deeply into the
top layers of bureaucracy at an executive agency than at an independent
commission.... Yet these differences are at best matters of degree.
Id. at 589-90.
85. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND THE
CONSUMER 3, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/div-stats/211491.htm (last visited Apr.
9, 2007).
86. Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383, 1383-97 (1976) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 18a, 1311-14 (2006)).
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subpoena power.8 7 The Department of Justice requested the use of
CIDs to ease its burden in investigations.8 8 Congress first granted the
Antitrust Division limited authority to issue CIDs in 1962 and
significantly expanded that authority when it passed the HSR Act.8 9
The HSR Act solidified and accelerated the gradual convergence of the
agencies' powers by instituting a merger clearance process and
granting the Antitrust Division the power to issue CIDs.
Beyond the procedural differences, the two agencies historically
differed in their mission and outlook. The FTC was created in the
watershed year of 1914 and was conceived as a regulatory committee
to complement and supplement the DOJ's law enforcement focus. 90
Both the Federal Trade Commission Act and the HSR Act were passed
in part to remedy problems and inadequacies in the Sherman
Antitrust Act and in the Department of Justice's enforcement
thereof.91 As a result, the two agencies began their life together as
mismatched twins, bound by much of the same law, but each with a
unique agenda and assortment of tools.
Despite different origins, their missions gradually grew more
alike. 92 Whereas the Antitrust Division's original role in antitrust law
87. Antitrust Civil Process Act, Pub. L. No. 87-664, 76 Stat. 548, 548-52 (1962) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-14); E. Thomas Sullivan, The Antitrust Division as a Regulatory
Agency: An Enforcement Policy in Transition, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 997, 1014 (1986).
88. See Sullivan, supra note 87, at 1013-14 ("The committee's recommendations included
the possible use of investigatory tools, such as Civil Investigative Demands (CID's), which the
Department had requested to aid in the production of evidence for litigation." (citation omitted)).
89. Id. at 1013-18.
90. Id. Professor Sullivan notes:
The legislative history underlying the creation of the Federal Trade
Commission illustrates how Congress viewed the Department of Justice at
the time. The debates made clear that a new regulatory commission would
introduce new investigative tools and an administrative 'body of law'
necessary to make antitrust enforcement more effective. The Senate
Committee observed that many of the present antitrust problems could have
been avoided if a regulatory commission, not the Department of Justice,
initially had been entrusted with the enforcement of the Sherman Act. The
Committee noted that changes in administrations had caused inherent
problems in the Attorney General's office. The Committee favored a separate
administrative agency in part because it believed the public was not ready for
a sharp swing in enforcement as carried out by the Department of Justice.
Thus while maintaining the Department's law enforcement role under the
Sherman Act, Congress created the Federal Trade Commission ... for the
purpose of establishing a framework for the regulation of corporations
engaged in interstate commerce.
Id. at 1012 (citations omitted).
91. Id. at 1012-18.
92. See Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission: A Retrospective, 72 ANTITRUST
L.J. 761, 765-66 (2005) (stating that though it originally was thought that the FTC Act had a
broader reach than the Sherman and Clayton Acts, both of the latter acts have been interpreted
so broadly that the FTC Act no longer plays a gap-filling role). In the years since 1914, Congress
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was as an enforcer and a litigator, by the 1970s agency officials and
legislators sounded the alarm out of concern that the Division was
creeping into the jurisdiction of the FTC.93 In the 1975 and 1976
congressional hearings for the HSR Act, then-FTC Chairman Thomas
Engman "expressed the view that the proposed pre-merger
notification might get the Antitrust Division (and the Commission)
into the business of 'controlling' mergers rather than 'maintaining
their proper role [of] enforc[ing] the antitrust laws.' 94 The statement
of the minority members of the Senate Judiciary Committee
emphasized the inherent differences between the two agencies and
their concerns in giving them identical powers:
The Department of Justice is not a regulatory agency subject to direct congressional
oversight, but is the prosecuting arm of the U.S. Government. There is a vast difference
between a prosecutor and a regulator. Conferring the investigatory powers of a
regulatory commission on a prosecutor is alien to our legal traditions and contrary to the
premise of the [F]ifth [A]mendment, which contemplates that a prosecutor can
investigate crime only through the grand jury process. 9 5
While these concerns were registered in the legislative history, they
did little to impede the passage of the HSR Act, which was enacted
without a conference resolution. 96
Armed with the tools and procedures established by the HSR
Act and preceding legislation, the Antitrust Division completed its
transition from a mere enforcement arm of the executive to a
regulatory agency. 97 Furthermore, the missions and outlook of the two
has passed the Celler-Kefauver Act Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125, 1125-28 (1950) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006)) (amending § 7 of the Clayton Act to include asset acquisitions);
the 1962 Antitrust Civil Process Act, Pub. L. No. 87-664, 76 Stat. 548, 548-52 (1962) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314); and the Hart-Scott Rodino Act, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat.
1383, 1383-97 (1976) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18a) (amending § 7A of the Clayton Act).
93. Sullivan, supra note 87, at 1014.16.
94. Id. at 1014 (citation omitted).
95. Id. at 1016 (citing S. REP. No. 94-803, at 196 (1976)). The Judiciary Committee minority
also worried about conferring CID power on the Antitrust Division because it "did not perceive
the Department as a regulatory agency subject to the safeguards of the Administrative
Procedure Act." Id. at 1015-16. They also "characterized the FTC as an investigator and
factfinder with no authority to determine civil or criminal liability and noted that the 'rigorous
protections relevant to criminal prosecutions would, therefore, be unnecessary.' " Id. at 1016
(citation omitted).
96. Id. at 1017.
97. Id. at 1024. Sullivan wrote:
[T]he Antitrust Division engages in regulatory-type conduct by: 1) setting
standards through its announced Guidelines, 2) reviewing data through the
required disclosure provisions, 3) screening out potentially anticompetitive
mergers through the preclearance screening process, 4) negotiating a
restructured merger if necessary, and finally, 5) if the bargaining process is
successful, issuing an approval, similar to a 'license,' through a business
review letter.
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agencies have grown even closer since the two agencies adopted of
Horizontal Merger Guidelines in 1992, amending and reconciling the
guidelines that each agency has operated under since the first
guidelines were issued by the DOJ in 1968.98 The joint guidelines
coordinated the economic and legal theory underpinning both
agencies' actions and provided regulated entities with greater
certainty as to the challenges they would face regardless of which
agency conducted the investigation of their potential merger. The shift
in missions and changes in available tools have weakened the
argument that the differences between the agencies support
maintaining an active competition between the two in the
preclearance process.
Opponents of the Accord may also argue that it would
eliminate the effect that competition itself may have on the agencies'
performance. Perhaps a significant benefit of dual jurisdiction is the
conflict it creates between the two agencies with overlapping missions.
One could argue that by having to compete with one another to lead
investigations, each is continually pushed to strengthen its expertise
and to develop a better "track record" than the other agency. If an
agency is able to demonstrate that it has won more cases, entered into
more favorable consent decrees, and has a stable of seasoned "experts"
in a particular industry, it is more likely to "win" clearance and be
authorized to proceed with the investigation. This type of competition
could prevent each agency from falling into complacency because
neither is completely secure.
However, the benefits of competition between the FTC and the
Antitrust Division are likely outweighed by the negatives. An
uncertain merger clearance process could skew agency incentives,99 tie
up valuable resources, 100 and lead to an opaque regulatory climate for
98. 1992 Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) T 13,104 (1997) (announcing that the
DOJ and the FTC were releasing joint Horizontal Merger Guidelines for the first time, updating
the DOJ's 1984 Merger Guidelines and the FTC's 1982 Statement Concerning Horizontal Merger
Guidelines).
99. MURIS, supra note 40, at 6-7. Muris wrote:
There is a natural and healthy competitive rivalry between the agencies.
Both hire highly capable and motivated attorneys and economists who strive
to make their institution preeminent. Yet both also must work together
routinely. The competition to excel is commendable and useful, but
acrimonious battles over enforcement terrain place destructive pressure on
the agencies and divert attention from their overriding mutual
responsibility-to enforce the antitrust laws effectively.
Id.
100. Id. at 6 ("The agencies waste precious enforcement resources contesting the right to
examine specific matters and in conducting investigations in marginal matters for the purpose of
using the experience gained to assert claims to other cases in the future.").
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parties to potential mergers.101 As a result, the rationale for
maintaining a more combative clearance process is counterbalanced
by many strong policy and legal arguments for streamlining the
process. 102
Regardless of the procedural and institutional differences
between the Antitrust Division and the FTC, it is difficult to argue
effectively that the Accord would have led to the loss of many benefits
of competition. There may be some situations where the outcome of an
investigation or a trial would differ depending upon which agency was
involved. The operative inquiry, however, is whether the Accord would
have altered this outcome or whether this is just a duality inherent in
the modern patchwork of antitrust enforcement. The Accord does not
substantively alter the possible inequality between the investigations
and outcomes of action by the different agencies. Prior to the 2002
Accord, the FTC and the Antitrust Division still had to fashion a
system by which one or the other would investigate a merger.
Moreover, over the course of more than fifty years, they interacted
pursuant to informal agreements which gradually evolved into a
status quo where each agency developed expertise in particular
industries. 103 While there were certainly turf battles where the
agencies fight over a case for weeks or months on end, this occurred in
a minority of the cases. 10 4 Functionally, the Accord did not "rob" either
agency of jurisdiction over certain industries. The agencies themselves
had carved up the antitrust pie decades earlier in a less than
transparent manner. The agreement essentially solidified those
divisions to eliminate the costly squabbling that sprung up on the
periphery of industries and in politically attractive situations. In fact,
in the years since the deal was aborted, the investigations that
101. Id. at 7. Muris stated:
The clearance process created considerable ambiguity over the likely
assignment of specific matters to the DOJ or the FTC. In certain sectors, such
as energy and media, the parties to a merger could not predict accurately
which agency would obtain clearance. This precluded the parties from
approaching an agency before filing a premerger notice to begin identifying
and addressing competitive concerns. Recourse to prefiling discussions, which
the European Commission has used effectively to expedite merger reviews,
would not be feasible in the U .S. if the identity of the reviewing agency could
not be determined with certainty in advance.
Id.
102. Id.; Letter from Roxane C. Busey, supra note 39.
103. See OVERVIEW OF THE FTC/DOJ CLEARANCE AGREEMENT, supra note 68 (describing the
history of informal agreements based on expertise).
104. See Antitrust Modernization Commission: Hearings on the FTC-DOJ Clearance Process,
supra note 79 (describing how the majority of clearance disputes are cleared in a timely fashion
though some take much longer to resolve).
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agencies have pursued have been largely in line with the allocations
that would have governed under the 2002 Accord. 105
The Accord had many strengths and could have made
significant strides toward streamlined, transparent, and effective
administration of the antitrust laws. While opponents of the
agreement may point to the historical differences in mission and
procedure in each agency, time has bridged much of the gap between
the FTC and the Antitrust Division. Further, Congressional
acquiescence in inter-agency agreements since 1948, coupled with the
lack of material substantive differences between previous agreements
and the 2002 one, bolstered the conclusion that not only was the
Accord a positive proposal, it was one that would not encounter
substantial dissent from Congress and the business community.
V. HOLLINGS'S SUCCESS IN DERAILING THE ACCORD Is TROUBLING
If James and Muris acted within their authority when they
entered into the 2002 Merger Clearance Accord, and the Accord was a
substantively strong agreement, the next inquiry is whether the
actions taken by Senator Hollings were a proper exercise of
congressional control of administrative agencies. Much of the
historical uneasiness with the constitutional status of administrative
agencies has been explained away by scholars who identify and
support both presidential and Congressional control of agencies. 10 6 It
is desirable for both Congress and the President to have a certain level
of control over the actions of agencies: The two branches are politically
accountable for their actions. 10 7 Here, however, Congress itself did not
105. See Baer et al., supra note 29, at 21. Baer et al. wrote:
The proposed allocations were based, in large part, upon historical trends, so
even without the agreement those trends might well have persisted.... And
what about the entertainment and media mergers that Senator Hollings
fought so hard to preserve for the FTC? Prior to the agreement, five of the
seven most recent entertainment and media deals were cleared to the
Antitrust Division. Since the collapse of the agreement, there have been at
least two antitrust investigations involving such mergers-one cleared to the
Antitrust Division and the other to the FTC.
Id.
106. See Kagan, supra note 7, at 2255 ("The rationale for strong congressional supervision of
administrative action is straightforward. Congress is a democratically elected and accountable
decisionmaking body, charged by the Constitution to make law for the nation.").
107. See id. (adding that "[iun establishing mechanisms to secure agencies' compliance with




act to overrule the 2002 Accord.108 Rather, it appears that a single
Senator effectively threatened to use his clout in the appropriations
process to force the two agencies to back down from their agreement.
It is important to examine Hollings's actions to determine whether his
efforts well served the role of congressional control, and if they did not,
what implications his success may have in the future.
The agreement fashioned between the FTC and the Antitrust
Division came to an abrupt halt with the objection of Senator Hollings.
James and Muris were scheduled to announce the plan at a news
conference on January 17, 2002, but postponed and then cancelled the
announcement in response to concerns expressed by the two
Democratic FTC Commissioners, and pressure from the senator. 10 9
Dissatisfied by the agreement,
Hollings made headlines by threatening to hold up or cut the regulators' funding if the
agreement [wasn't] revised. Speaking to FTC Chairman Timothy Muris at a March 19
Appropriations Committee hearing, Hollings said, 'I can tell you here and now, Mr.
Chairman, that we know how to act... What we'll have to do is, by gosh, just come here
and cut that budget around so that we get your attention.... Since Hollings and Muris
crossed swords, Washington insiders have been treated to the spectacle of a public spat
between the executive and legislative branches of government. Highlights of the dispute,
which at times seemed more in the realm of tabloid TV shows than the normally stolid
committee rooms on Capitol Hill, included a threat by Hollings to cut the salaries of
Muris and other senior regulators. Speaking to a reporter in a Capitol Hill hallway,
Hollings said he was going to "eliminate" Muris. 
11 0
In response to Hollings's public indignation, Attorney General
John Ashcroft instructed James "not [to] sign the agreement; the press
conference was cancelled and the disappointed spectators told that
any decision on clearance would be delayed."11' The senator, who was
the Chairman of the Commerce, Justice, and State Appropriations
Subcommittee, "said through a spokesman that he had 'very
substantial concerns' about shifting antitrust oversight from the trade
agency-which does not answer directly to the White House-to
political appointees at the Justice Department."'' 12
108. See MURIS, supra note 40, at 17 ("[T]here is a myth that the 2002 Clearance Agreement
failed because of opposition from 'Congress.' The opposition came from only one member, albeit
an important one.").
109. 2002 Agreement, supra note 46; MOZELLE W. THOMPSON, CONCERNING THE MARCH 5,
2002 CLEARANCE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/03/clearancemwt.htm; Philip
Shenon, Plan to Split up Antitrust Oversight Stalls, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2002, at C2.
110. Brent Shearer, Merger Clearance Accord Turns Nasty, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS J.,
Jun. 1, 2002, at 4, 6.
111. Neal R. Stoll & Shepard Goldfein, Politics and Power and Antitrust, Oh My!, 227 N.Y.
L.J., Apr. 16, 2002.
112. Shenon, supra note 109.
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Despite Hollings's objections, James and Muris officially
announced the agreement two months later on March 5.113 In the
ensuing months, Hollings escalated his efforts to thwart
implementation of the plan, threatening to use his clout to hold up or
cut funding for the agencies. 114 In response, the FTC and the Antitrust
Division sought support for the agreement from members of Congress,
industry groups, and the Section of Antitrust Law of the American
Bar Association. 115 However, perceiving that they lacked enough
political clout to fight Hollings, Muris and James issued a statement
on May 20, announcing their withdrawal of the agreement.11 6
It is important for Congress to be able to effectively monitor
agency activity. Scholarly support of congressional control of
administrative agencies is predicated on the legitimizing effect
Congress can have upon agencies by virtue of its constitutional
powers. 117 Elected officials are ultimately answerable to voters and
have been constitutionally endowed with the responsibility to make
the laws of the nation.118 Congress has finite resources, so over time it
has delegated responsibility to various agencies, while retaining the
tools and authority to oversee the activities of those agencies. 119
Among the strongest rationalizations for delegating lawmaking and
enforcement authority to agencies is that it is impractical, and indeed
probably impossible, for Congress to deal with all of the minutiae
113. 2002 Agreement, supra note 46.
114. Shearer, supra note 110.
115. See Letter from Senator Herb Kohl, Chairman, Subcommittee on Antitrust, Bus. Rights,
& Competition, & Senator Mike DeWine, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Antitrust, Bus.
Rights, & Competition, to John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen., Charles James, Assistant Attorney Gen.
for Antitrust & Timothy Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n (Mar. 1, 2002), available at
http://ftc.gov/opa/2002/03/clearance/kohldewine.pdf.
116. Charles A. James, Statement Regarding DOJ/FTC Clearance Agreement (May 20,
2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002fMay/02-ag_302.htm. James's entire
statement was as follows:
The Department stands by its view that the agreement was good public policy
that was working to make antitrust enforcement more effective. In fact, since
the agreement became effective, antitrust investigations were being
commenced within a matter of days, and there were no clearance disputes
between the agencies. However, in view of the opposition expressed by Sen.
Hollings, Chairman of the Commerce, Justice, and State Appropriations
Subcommittee, to the agreement and the prospect of budgetary consequence
for the entire Justice Department if we stood by the agreement, the
Department will no longer be adhering to the agreement.
Id.
117. Kagan, supra note 7, at 2255.
118. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
119. See Kagan, supra note 7, at 2255-56 (describing the manner in which Congress has
delegated discretion to administrative agencies and has attempted to retain oversight of the
activities of those agencies).
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involved in today's regulatory regime. 120 The fact that agencies can be
staffed with individuals who possess an expertise that may translate
into a superior ability to make and enforce specialized regulations also
bolsters the case for delegation. 121 Reined in by Congressional control,
these agencies can serve a critical role in the administration and
development of regulatory law.
Congress has a variety of methods of control at its disposal in
engaging with administrative agencies. These include general
monitoring and oversight, "ad hoc monitoring," legislation, and
appropriations. 122 While it has not been the focus of as much scholarly
literature as other forms of legislation, Congress's constitutional
appropriations power has long been an extremely effective tool in
controlling federal agencies. 123 In fact, in recent history Congress
successfully used its power of the purse to coerce the Federal Trade
Commission into revising its policies and priorities by drastically
slashing its budget.124 Regardless of the effectiveness of many of these
means of control, the principles of non-delegation counsel restraint,
particularly in the use of monitoring to influence agency actions. 125
Congressional control is certainly vital to the legitimacy of the
administrative state, but where the control becomes absolute,
influential legislators have a cheap and easy lawmaking tool at their
disposal. Rather than having to gather enough support for an
appropriations bill to cut the agencies' funding or for an amendment to
120. Id. at 2261 (identifying expertise as a traditional justification for delegating broad
powers to agencies).
121. Id.
122. See Kenneth W. Clarkson & Timothy J. Muris, Constraining the Federal Trade
Commission: The Case of Occupational Regulation, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 77, 90 (1980) (listing
possible methods of Congressional control).
123. See PETER L. STRAUSS, TODD D. RAKOFF & CYNTHIA R. FARINA, GELLHORN AND BYSE'S
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES AND COMMENTS 222 (rev. 10th ed. 2003), which states:
One of the most important determinates of regulatory behavior is virtually
invisible to administrative law. Rarely do legislative decisions to appropriate,
or executive decisions to spend, present themselves in a form that the
judiciary will see as a 'case' or 'controversy.' The other two branches,
however, have long recognized the power of money to shape public policy.
124. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 ("All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other
Bills."); id. § 9, cl. 7 ("No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law...."); Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic
Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission,
91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 775 (1983) (describing Congress's success in 1979 in forcing changes in
FTC policy by withholding appropriations).
125. There is a concern about congressional aggrandizement that if Congress can delegate
broad authority to an agency and can easily take some of that power back through means that
are less than those required by the legislative process, that Congress has a cheap and easy
means to make "law."
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the Clayton Act to alter the mission and procedures of the FTC and
the Antitrust Division, Senator Hollings was able to accomplish his
goal with a few vocal outbursts. 126 Administrative agencies may be
most effective when they are allowed to undertake their delegated
mission within the boundaries of clear controlling legislation. 127 Here
Hollings was able to exploit the broad delegation to the FTC and the
Antitrust Division by stepping into the void of explicit legislation and
inserting his personal preferences.
Hollings's actions appear to reflect the political maneuverings
of a single congressman rather than the will of a Congress interested
in derailing the Accord. The troubling aspect of this episode is not that
Congress could cut or threaten to cut agency funding in an expression
of displeasure at agency activities, for it is undisputed that it could. 128
The troubling notion is that a lone Senator was able to change a
substantively sound agency policy simply by threatening to cut
funding. That he was able to succeed is potentially indicative of
systematic failure where, despite the strength of their agreement and
having precedent on their side, the heads of these two administrative
agencies were vulnerable to the pressure of one legislator.
Realistically, this type of behavior happens all of the time and
it is very unlikely to change. Members of Congress influence law and
policy through informal channels on a regular basis, and they find
particular success in doing so where the delegations of authority to
agencies are broad and vague.1 29 But when this type of informal
pressure wins out over a well-considered positive administrative
reform, there is cause for concern that legitimate policy considerations
are being subsumed by a powerful legislator's idiosyncratic desires.
Individual members of Congress will continue to find success in
controlling the actions of administrative agencies, particularly where
Congress has delegated broad authority to the agencies. It is
important to identify possible solutions which will bring balance to the
relationship between the FTC, the Antitrust Division and Congress.
There will always be the risk that a single politician will be able to
steer federal antitrust policy and procedures until the FTC and the
126. See Sikora, supra note 3, at 13.
127. See Kagan, supra note 7, at 2255-56 (describing one theory of administrative action, the
"classical 'transmission belt' theory," under which Congress delegates "specifically and clearly to
administrative agencies" and "administrative officials may exercise coercive powers only as
authorized by and in conformity with legislative directives").
128. Id. at 2259 & n.38; see also STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 123, at 234 (explaining that
"Congress has become adept at using the appropriations power as a way to force course-
corrections in administrative policy").
129. See DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE
PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 55-56 (1993) (discussing Congress's tactic of delegating broad
powers to agencies, allowing pressures from powerful interests to influence the agencies).
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Antitrust Division are sufficiently empowered to withstand such
pressure. If we are concerned about the outcome of Hollings's actions,
we may be able to minimize the effect of similar occurrences by
narrowing the delegation to agencies, empowering agency heads, or
restructuring agency decisionmaking. The following Part will address
these three possible approaches.
VI. SOLUTION: THREE APPROACHES TO FOSTERING AN ENVIRONMENT
CONDUCIVE TO INTERAGENCY ENFORCEMENT REFORM
The status quo in federal antitrust enforcement is inadequate.
The current system is opaque, inefficient, and it is overseen by
administrators who have been procedurally and politically crippled.
The inequities in the relationship between the federal antitrust
agencies and Congress must be addressed before meaningful and
lasting reform can occur. This Note proposes three approaches to
improving the current state of federal antitrust enforcement and
creating an environment in which the 2002 Accord could succeed: (1)
amending the HSR Act; (2) improving the political strength of
appointees to head the FTC and Antitrust Division; or (3) engaging in
notice-and-comment rulemaking.
An important caveat regarding the highly politicized nature of
this situation must accompany any proposal. Regardless of what
structural or procedural reforms are introduced, the actors involved
are political creatures, and there will always be informal political
tensions. Senator Hollings was able to do what he did because of his
political capital, including his seniority in the Senate, and his
connections. Some legislators, and for that matter some agency heads,
will wield more power than others simply due to personal and political
peculiarities. Hollings's threats would not have been successful if
James and Muris had not believed that he would likely be successful
in slashing their budgets or upending their careers.' 30 While we
cannot know what would have happened had they not rescinded their
agreement, Hollings may have been able to garner the support to cut
appropriations to the Antitrust Division and the FTC or to propose
and pass legislation altering the organic statutes with respect to
division of responsibility.1 3 1 If it reached that point, then the
aforementioned policy objections to the outcome of the 2002 Accord
episode would disappear. These proposals are not directed at
130. See MURIS, supra note 40, at 17 (describing Muris' and James' belief that Senator
HoUings would object).
131. An additional player who must be taken into account is the President. Presidential
acquiescence would have also been necessary for the Merger Accord to survive.
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preventing Congress from exercising such power; they suggest only
what the FTC, the Antitrust Division, or Congress could do to possibly
foster an environment in the future where a substantively strong
proposal by the agencies will be more resistant to the political desires
of a single politician.
A. Congress Should Increase the Specificity of the HSR Act
First, the most promising solution would require Congress to
amend the HSR Act to increase the statute's specificity with respect to
the merger clearance process. Paradoxically, the agencies would have
a greater ability to resist pressures such as the ones that came from
Senator Hollings if the organic statutes delegated less discretion with
regard to the merger clearance process. As noted above, the Clayton
and HSR Acts, along with their accompanying legislative history,
provide little guidance to the FTC and Antitrust Division as to how to
divide responsibility for enforcement of the merger laws and how to
handle potential conflicts between the two agencies. 132 If Congress
were to amend the legislation to provide some general constraints as
to how they should set up the clearance process, then there would be
less uncertainty about the process that they did implement as long as
it did not run afoul of the law's requirements. At present, the
legislation delegates nearly complete discretion to set up the
procedures and even to define the terms in the Act.1 33 Because of
Congress' broad delegation empowering the FTC with responsibility:
the agency could respond to the needs of a changing economy, shifting its focus to the
most serious problems in the economy and enabling it to cope with novel...
anticompetitive practices.... [T]hat broad flexibility takes its toll. It means that, unlike
such regulatory agencies as the Federal Communications Commission, the Interstate
Commerce Commission, or the Food and Drug Administration, the Federal Trade
Commission lacks an industry with a strong vested interest in its continued vitality.
Thus any significant law enforcement activity by the agency is likely to receive little
support but to generate much controversy and criticism.
1 3 4
Congress could take a number of approaches to amending the
HSR Act to provide a more desirable clearance process. On the least
invasive end of the spectrum, the amended statute could clarify who
should craft pre-clearance agreements and whether they should be
subject to periodic congressional scrutiny. Much of the dissent from
the two FTC Commissioners who objected to the Accord arose out of a
belief that the FTC Chairman should include the entire Commission
132. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2006).
133. See id. § 18a(d).
134. William J. Baer, Where to from Here: Reflection on the Recent Saga of the Federal Trade
Commission, 39 OKLA. L. REV. 51, 56 (1986).
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in the process. 135 A simple statutory indication of which actors should
be involved in the development of inter-agency agreements would
clear up such disagreements. At the other end of the spectrum,
Congress could enact language that would control the details of pre-
clearance agreements. The new statute could clarify what factors
should be considered in determining which agency investigates a
given merger, or it could go as far as to divide permanently
responsibility for mergers according to industry.
Amending the HSR Act to clarify the manner in which the FTC
and the Antitrust Division should construct their inter-agency
agreements would be the best of both worlds. As it stands now, the
FTC and the Antitrust Division have total discretion over the entire
pre-clearance process, which potentially leaves the agencies
vulnerable to informal pressures. Not only will more specific
legislation strengthen the position of the agency heads in defending
their pre-clearance system, it will signal a greater level of formal
congressional control as well.
B. Agency Heads Should Be Empowered
Second, if agency heads are not sufficiently empowered, they
are more likely to bow to the pressure of vocal politicians. It may be
difficult, however, to ensure that agency heads are both sufficiently
independent to undertake the actions statutorily delegated to them,
but sufficiently beholden to Congress (and the President) to ensure
that they remain responsive to the branches that created and
empowered them in the first place. Just as in all politics, personality,
experience, and connections matter, so a politically savvy and
influential individual would be the ideal appointee to lead either
agency. 136 A strong leader could ameliorate some of the inherent
weakness in his or her agency's position and would be in a better
position to resist "illegitimate" external pressures. 137 A strong agency
head does not necessarily translate into a runaway agency that
oversteps its bounds: Congress as a whole, as well as the President,
still firmly hold the upper hand regardless of who is in charge of an
agency at a given time. But a leader who could push back when
Congress moves in would ultimately contribute to a balance in which
the agency would be more likely to be free to pursue its legislative
135. 2002 Agreement, supra note 46; THOMPSON, supra note 109.
136. See William E. Kovacic, The Quality of Appointments and the Capability of the Federal
Trade Commission, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 915, 927-29 (1997) (developing a desirable profile for the
ideal FTC Commissioner).
137. Id. at 917 ("Strong appointees help shape policies that compel assent-or at least
discourage challenge-by external bodies.").
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mandate within the confines of the delegation, without either
overstepping its authority or bowing unnecessarily to encroaching
politicians. 138 Just as the legislative process benefits from the give and
take of the two-party system, the administrative state would operate
more effectively if there were powerful players on both sides of the
debate.
Control follows money, so any examination of the strength of
an agency head must keep in mind the impact of appropriations on
agency actions. It almost goes without saying that if the agencies were
less dependent upon Congress for their funding, the threat of revoked
or slashed funding would be substantially dampened, leaving the
agencies freer to operate. While the appropriations power rests
unquestionably within Congress's constitutional authority, there is
room to slightly lessen the impact of a threat to use the power of the
purse. In fact, when the economy is strong and a greater number of
corporations are merging, the FTC in particular is less dependent
upon Congress for its operating budget. Under the HSR Act,
corporations who are large enough to trigger the mandatory merger
clearance process must pay a fee with their filing. 139 While filing fees
offset a large portion of the FTC's annual budget in the late 1990s,
that portion drops substantially in leaner economic times.1 40
If the agencies can offset much of their budget requests with
the collection of fees, then they will have to rely on Congress for a
much smaller portion of their budgets. Budgetary battles may
decrease, and the agencies will be at their most powerful to resist
Congressional encroachment and will be more likely to carry out
policy and procedural initiatives. Thus while there is no way to control
138. See id. at 917-18 (arguing that "weak or merely adequate" commissioners have
prevented the FTC from achieving its statutory goals).
139. Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act § 605, 15 U.S.C. § 18a n.5 (2006) (Assessment and Collection of Filing Fees).
This Act, enacted as a note to the statute, reads in part:
[T]he Federal Trade Commission shall assess and collect filing fees
established in subsection (b) which shall be paid by persons acquiring voting
securities or assets who are required to file premerger notifications by [the]
section 7A of the Clayton Act and the regulations promulgated
thereunder.... Fees collected pursuant to this section shall be divided evenly
between and credited to the appropriations, Federal Trade Commission,
'Salaries and Expenses' and Department of Justice, 'Salaries and Expenses,
Antitrust Division' ....
Id. The filing fees have been adjusted over the years, as have the levels of assets that trigger
them, but currently the fees are $45,000, $125,000, and $280,000, depending upon the value of
the merger. Id.
140. See, e.g., FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 15
(2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/02/fyO7ftccongressbudgetjustification.pdf
(requesting a budget of $223,000,000, offset by a predicted $120,000,000 in HSR filing fees and
$18,000,000 in Do Not Call Fees (a new fee collection implemented in FY 2003)).
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the economy to ensure that there are enough mergers every year to
fund the regulatory agencies that police them, it is clear that the
agencies are likely at their height of power in the years when they
have less of a stake in the outcome of the appropriations process. The
law pertaining to the collection and disbursement of filing fees could
be amended to keep any fees collected in excess of budgetary
requirements, in an "operating account" of sorts from which the FTC
could draw in leaner years. This could lessen the variability in agency
independence from the budgetary process from year to year, and
would possibly, once again depending on the economy's performance,
provide the agencies with a buffer to ameliorate the impact of a threat
to cut funding. 141 It is also clear that an FTC Chairman will face
greater challenges in years with fewer filings, and accordingly will be
in greater need of political acumen and influence.
C. The FTC and the Antitrust Division Should Consider Using Notice-
and-Comment Rulemaking
Under the HSR Act, the FTC and the Antitrust Division are
authorized to "prescribe such other rules as may be necessary and
appropriate.... ." with respect to the premerger notification clearance
process. 142 These rules are likely of an interpretive nature, and thus
need not be promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking. 143
The agencies may, however, elect to use more formal procedures even
though they are not required to do so. The outcome of the 2002 Accord
counsels that perhaps they would have found success in fashioning
their accord if they had undertaken notice-and-comment rulemaking.
Agencies usually prefer to engage in actions less formal than
notice-and-comment rulemaking whenever possible. Informal
rulemaking affords them greater flexibility and requires much less in
the way of resources. Notice-and-comment rulemaking entails a
substantial commitment of time and personnel on the part of the
agency. It also locks the agency into the resulting regulations in a way
that less formal rulemaking does not. Once a regulation has been
promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking, the agency is
bound thereby; the agency may only amend or repeal the regulation
141. Of course, Congress could "cut" some of the money from filing fees from the FTC's
budget during the appropriations process, but the political argument to take money away from
the agency is likely weaker than the argument to refrain from appropriating money to the
agency.
142. 15 U.S.C. § 1a(d)(2)(C) (2006).
143. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2006).
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through further notice-and-comment rulemaking. 144 As a result, it is
usually in an agency's interest to use the least amount of procedure
required.
This was a situation, however, where the FTC and the
Antitrust Division may have strengthened their position if they had
elected to undertake notice-and-comment rulemaking when fashioning
the Accord. If, rather than hammering out an agreement through
informal means, the agencies had utilized more formal procedure, the
resulting agreement would have been better protected from political
pressure. It would have provided them with a legal shield should
Hollings or another legislator have attempted to thwart the Accord
through informal means. The loss of flexibility and the devotion of
additional resources may have been justified if the outcome was an
agreement that could withstand the political maneuverings of a single
vocal Senator. If the agencies were to revisit the proposed Accord,
they should therefore consider utilizing notice-and-comment
rulemaking.
VII. CONCLUSION: THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ANTITRUST
MODERNIZATION COMMISSION AND THE FUTURE
The 2002 struggles over and ultimate defeat of the Accord
brought to light some troubling issues with respect to federal antitrust
enforcement. While constitutional concerns advocate ensuring that
administrative agencies can be controlled to some extent by either or
both of the political branches, there is a delicate balance between a
runaway agency and an agency which becomes a tool for individual
legislators to engage in cheap and easy lawmaking. The lessons of the
2002 stand-off between Muris, James, and Hollings will hopefully
inform an examination of possible structural and procedural
deficiencies in the relationship between the federal antitrust
authorities and Congress.
An examination of these issues must not be performed in a
vacuum, for Congress has taken notice of the shortcomings of federal
merger enforcement. In 2002 the Antitrust Modernization Committee
was charged with a broad mission of "examin[ing] whether the need
exists to modernize the antitrust laws and to identify and study
related issues. 145 In particular, the AMC identified problem areas in
144. See Homemakers N. Shore, Inc. v. Bowen, 832 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating
that if a regulation is adopted through notice-and-comment rulemaking, "its text may be changed
only in that fashion").
145. Antitrust Modernization Commission Act of 2002 § 11053, 15 U.S.C. § 1 n.4 (2006)
(Other Provisions).
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the interaction between the two agencies. 146 The AMC requested
comments concerning whether the continuation of dual federal merger
enforcement is advisable, whether there was a difference between the
two agencies' actions, and whether in response to "[c]ommenters [who]
have advised that disagreements between the FTC and DOJ
concerning the clearance of mergers for review by one or the other
agency have unreasonably delayed regulatory review in some
cases,... the FTC-DOJ merger review clearance process [should] be
revised to make it more efficient?"'147 The deadline for comments on
these issues was July 15, 2005,148 and the AMC recently presented
their final report to the President and Congress on April 2, 2007.149
The report endorses the substance of the failed 2002 Merger Accord
and calls for action on the part of the agencies and Congress to remedy
the shortcomings of the current clearance process:
The Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
should develop and implement a new merger clearance agreement based on the
principles in the 2002 Clearance Agreement between the agencies, with the goal of
clearing all proposed transactions to one agency or the other within a short period of
time. To this end, the appropriate congressional committees should encourage both
antitrust agencies to reach a new agreement, and the agencies should consult with these
committees in developing the new agreement.
15 0
Further, the AMC's report recommends that Congress enact
legislation requiring the clearance of mergers within a short window
of time.15'
The AMC highlighted two aspects of the 2002 Merger Accord in
particular that it recommends should be part of any new agreement. 152
The commission's final recommendations endorsed the division of
responsibility according to industry. 153 The AMC identified a number
146. INITIAL SLATE OF ISSUES SELECTED FOR STUDY, supra note 5, at 2.
147. Request for Public Comment: Enforcement Institutions, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,902-28,907
(May 19, 2005), available at http://www.amc.gov/comments/requestcommentfr_28902/
enforcement comments.pdf.
148. Id.
149. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note
6, at i.
150. Id. at 13, 131, 134 (recommendation 22).
151. Id. at 14, 131, 137 (recommendation 23). Three commissioners, Burchfield, Cannon, and
Yarowsky, did not join this recommendation. Id. at 137 n.*.
152. Id. at 135-36.
153. See id. at 136. The AMC clarified its endorsement of the industry allocations,
explaining:
The Commission does not take a position on how industries should be
allocated between the two agencies or the specific allocations in the 2002
Clearance Agreement. However, those allocations may provide a useful
starting point for discussion, because they were based largely on the agencies'
historical experience and resulted from extensive negotiation between the
agencies. Far more important than the specific allocations is finding a
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of benefits of clearly defined division of responsibility, including
improved transparency and predictability, the elimination of "the
agencies' incentives to conduct unnecessary, or more extensive,
investigations in ongoing cases to enhance claims of expertise for use
in future disputes," and the elimination of "incentives to fight for
clearance to review a particular merger in order to preserve its claims
of expertise in future mergers in the same or similar industries."154
The recommendations also focused on the 2002 Merger Accord's use of
a "tie-breaker" when the agencies cannot resolve a clearance dispute
swiftly. 155 The 2002 Merger Accord instituted an arbitration process in
the event of such disputes, but the AMC is open to a number of types
of tie-breakers as long as they serve to resolve any disputes quickly.156
The recommendation that will perhaps have the greatest
impact in preventing the recurrence of an episode similar to the 2002
one is the AMC's recognition of the importance of the agencies'
relationship with Congress to the success of any new proposals. 157
While the AMC recommendations also endorse Congressional
enactment of legislation requiring the agencies to clear matters within
a statutorily prescribed time, they understand that regardless of any
new legislation the underlying relationship between the agencies and
Congress will be a key factor in the future development of federal
antitrust enforcement. 158 In advocating for the adoption of the
principles of the 2002 Merger Accord, the AMC recognizes that
Congressional opposition led to the demise of the 2002 Clearance Agreement, and
concern over the potential for renewed congressional opposition has prevented the FTC
and the DOJ from seeking to implement a new clearance agreement since 2002. To
facilitate congressional support and guidance, the agencies should consult with the
appropriate congressional committees in developing a new clearance agreement.
procedure that permits the agencies to reach clearance decisions quickly




156. Id. The AMC discusses other tie-breakers that may be faster than arbitration, including
random approaches like coin-flips or a possession arrow. Id.
157. Id.
158. See id. at 137, which states:
The Commission also recommends that Congress enact a statute that
requires the agencies to resolve clearance promptly. A statute will impose
additional discipline on the agencies to ensure that clearance is resolved
expeditiously. Furthermore, it will enhance the ability of Congress to use its
oversight authority to monitor the agencies' compliance with the clearance
requirement. Indeed, whether or not Congress enacts legislation in this area,
the Commission believes that the timeliness of clearance dispute resolutions
should be a part of Congress' continuing oversight of the agencies.
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Congress should encourage the agencies in this process and provide guidance to allow
the agencies to implement a clearance agreement that is satisfactory to Congress. 159
The AMC report underscores the fact that before the
substantive and procedural reforms of the 2002 Merger Accord can
find a new incarnation in future agreements, the troubles that sank
Muris's and James's efforts must be addressed fully.
The Antitrust Modernization Commission's recommendations
will likely play a large role in the implementation of any solution. If
the agency heads possess too little power to assert their interests and
'particular members of Congress have been able to "capture" the
agencies, the weight of recommendations from a bipartisan
commission could be an ideal interim solution. If Congressional
committees do encourage the agency heads to construct a new merger
clearance agreement, the resulting process will be less vulnerable to
attack by an individual member of Congress. And if Congress enacts
legislation requiring clearance within a set time period, it will narrow
the delegation to agencies, eliminating some of the vulnerability the
agencies now face. Perhaps the AMC's report will spur Congress to
reconsider the merits of the failed 2002 Accord, fostering an
environment in which the agencies will be empowered to implement a
similar agreement. If the AMC's recommendations go unheeded,
however, there will still be considerable work to do to repair the
underlying problems in the relationship between these agencies and
Congress. Without action on the part of Congress, the President, or
the agency heads themselves, the FTC and the Antitrust Division will
still suffer from the weaknesses inherent in broad delegation and they
will continue to find it difficult to solve the problems of the clearance
process on their own.
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